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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes an improved Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) for Ethernet-based networks. In 
the proposed alternative method, the ARP request packets are not broadcasted but instead unicasted 
to an ARP server which will have all the <ip, MAC> mappings of all the hosts connected to the network. 
This significantly reduces ARP signaling and processing overhead. The ARP server obtains the mappings 
through a novel passive method that does not introduce additional overhead in the network. Furthermore, 
the use of the ARP server makes it much easier to secure the network against certain attacks like ARP 
poisoning.
Keywords: ARP, protocol optimization, ARP poisoning, broadcast, unicast.
ABSTRAK
Kertas kerja ini bertujuan memperbaiki ‘Address resolution Protocol’ (ARP) untuk rangkaian ethernet-based. 
Untuk mencapai matlamat ini kaedah alternatif telah digunakan iaitu permintaan paket ARP (ARP request 
packet) tidak lagi menggunakan broadcast tetapi unicast kepada ARP server di mana segala pemetaan <ip, 
mac> untuk semua host yang berada di dalam rangkaian. Ini akan mengurangkan isyarat ARP dan pemproses 
overhead dengan berkesan. Server Arp akan mengekalkan pemetaan melalui kaedah novel pasif yang tidak 
akan memperkenalkan penambahan overhead di dalam rangkaian. Tambahan lagi, penggunaan ARP server 
akan memudahkan cara untuk melindungi rangkaian daripada serangan seperti ARP poisoning.




Traditionally, when a host S running Ethernet 
protocol needs to communicate with a target host 
T on the same local area network, the network layer 
will pass the 32-bit IP address to the data layer and 
in order to send the packets to the destination host, 
the data layer will need to convert the IP address 
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to the 40-bit MAC address of the host T thus the 
packets could be directly send over to host T 
through the physical media layer.
 In current protocol design, each host will have 
a specially allocated space in memory known as 
an ARP cache where all hosts communicated by 
this host before will have their <ip, MAC> kept in 
the host’s ARP cache memory. During the process 
of converting the IP address to the MAC address, 
if the host S does not have the <ip, MAC> in the 
cache mapping entry, it will send an ARP request 
and broadcast it to every host in the network 
hoping the target host T will generate an ARP 
reply packet with the MAC address of host T. Thus, 
the ARP cache reduces unnecessary ARP request 
broadcast messages as it is assumed that once 
the host S communicates with another host T, the 
chance for this host S to communicate further 
with the same host T again is high. 
 Every time an ARP request broadcast message 
is sent, all hosts including host T will receive the 
ARP request and each host must then process the 
ARP request and determine if the ARP request 
contains an IP address of the current host. If 
any host detects that the ARP request packet 
contains its IP address (there should be only one 
such host at any time as the IP address is to be 
unique in one network), it will then generate an 
ARP reply message and sends the reply directly 
to host S. The mapping will be kept for a short 
period and after some time where there are no 
communications between host S and host T, the 
mapping of <ip, MAC> for host T will be purged 
from the cache. This is to reduce unnecessary 
mappings in the ARP cache memory in view 
of the processing time and memory wastage if 
mappings are not removed. 
 This paper shows that it is possible to change 
the behavior of ARP broadcast messages to 
unicast messages so that the disadvantages of 
broadcasting ARP messages could be avoided. It 
will also provide evidence that this new approach 
is actually workable by providing the actual 
implementation results which had been tested 
in the information technology laboratory in the 
campus.
RELATED WORK
The Secure Address Resolution Protocol (Gouda 
& Huang, 2003) (S-ARP) has been designed to 
secure networks that use ARP against attacks 
like ARP poisoning. ARP poisoning is where 
an attacker corrupts ARP caches of hosts in a 
network by sending faked ARP replies. By using 
ARP poisoning, an attacker may, for example, 
cause all IP traffic meant for a victim host to be 
redirected to an arbitrary host that the attacker 
chooses. Thus, the attacker can arrange denial-
of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks 
and so on.
 S-ARP uses the so called invite-accept 
approach to collect the ARP mappings from 
all hosts at an ARP server. The ARP server will 
broadcast an authenticated ARP request. The 
host whose IP address is in the ARP request 
can authenticate the packet before sending 
an authenticated ARP. The ARP server can then 
ensure that the message is not tampered with 
before updating the <ip,MAC> mapping in its 
the ARP table. 
 However, we desire a method in which the 
ARP server does not have to generate additional 
overhead (as with S-ARP) to collect the ARP 
mappings. In this paper, a new method will be 
presented that does not even generate any ARP 
request message in order to build up the ARP 
table as it simply passively obtains the IP address 
and MAC address mapping at the same time 
the IP address is assigned to the host by a DHCP 
server. This reduces a lot of unnecessary ARP 
requests during the setting up of the ARP table as 
well during when the host is trying to resolve the 
<ip,MAC> mapping. The new, improved method 
will be explained further in Section 3.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Efficiency Considerations
Broadcasting behavior of ARP messages has 
creating some disadvantages in traditional 
network. First, it generates unnecessary ARP 
request messages that has been send to every 
host in the network each time one of the host 
in the network is trying to resolve the <ip,MAC> 
mapping that is not found in the ARP cache 
entry of the sending host. One such message is 
multiplied by the number of hosts connected to 
the network. Assuming the network has 100 hosts 
connected to each other, every time one of the 
100 host, host S needs to send a ARP broadcast 
message, instead of sending the message to 
one host (the target host T), the ARP message 
is multiplied by 100 and there will be 100 ARP 
request messages received and processed by 
nodes in the network where theoretically only 
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one message need to be received and processed. 
Assuming there will be one such request for 
each host in every 10 seconds, there will be 6000 
((60/10 packets for each host* 100 host)*100 
host) such messages in one minute and only 600 
such messages are actually required if ARP works 
in unicast mode.
Security Considerations
Another problem occurs when a host S sends an 
ARP broadcast messages to every host during an 
ARP request. Since every host in the network will 
receive the broadcasted messages, the identity 
of the host S (with IP address and MAC address) 
are revealed to every host in the network. In any 
case when one of the hosts currently connected 
in the network is attacked by a hacker, the hacker 
can use this host as a resource base to quietly 
collect all <ip,MAC> mappings of all hosts in the 
network and this allows the hacker to launch a 
new attack after it has collected and analyzed 
the information.
 For example, an attacker could engage in ARP 
Poisoning, i.e., by providing a false MAC address 
into the cache, one could easily re-direct all 
packets that are supposed to be sent to a host 
located elsewhere to the hacker’s host so that 
the latter can sniff the packets. By ARP Poisoning 
both hosts which are communicating with each 
other, the hacker can actually sniff all packets 
passing through both hosts by re-directing the 
packets towards the designated destination after 
receiving the packets from the victim host. This 
is a type of MITM (Man in the middle) attack.
 All the hacker needs to do is to simply send 
a forge ARP reply broadcast message. In other 
Ethernet transmission layer (not necessarily accessible to the user):
 48.bit: Ethernet address of destination
 48.bit: Ethernet address of sender
 16.bit: Protocol type = ether_type$ADDRESS_RESOLUTION
Ethernet packet data:
 16.bit: (ar$hrd) Hardware address space (e.g., Ethernet)
 16.bit: (ar$pro) Protocol address space.
 8.bit: (ar$hln) byte length of each hardware address
 8.bit: (ar$pln) byte length of each protocol address
 16.bit: (ar$op) opcode (ares_op$REQUEST | ares_op$REPLY)
nbytes: (ar$sha) Hardware address of forget of packet, n from ar$hln.
 mbytes: (ar$spa) Protocol address of sender of packet, m from ar$pln.
 nbytes: (ar$tha) Hardware address of target of packet (if known).
 mbytes: (ar$tpa) Protocol address of target
Implementation Considerations
ARP request messages are broadcasted as the 
host S requesting the MAC address of host T 
does not know the MAC address of the host 
T, if it know, it can simply sends a ARP request 
direct to the host T without sending a broadcast 
message. Since host S only know the IP address 
of host T, it is thus inserted this IP address into 
the ARP request (ar$tpa), it will also insert its own 
IP address (ar$spa) and its MAC address (ar$sha) 
into the same packet. It will set the ar$tha to
words, when the sending host request the MAC 
address for a given IP addresses, the reply does 
not come from the host holding that IP address,; 
instead, the hacker replies to the request before 
the actual host holding that IP address replies. 
What if the host holding the IP address also 
replies? Whoever wins will get his MAC address 
updated in the cache. Moreover, even if the victim 
did not send an ARP Request, and already knows 
the IP to MAC mapping of the destination, an 
attacker can still launch an ARP poisoning attack. 
What the hacker does is simply send a forge ARP 
reply and the host will happily update that IP to 
MAC mapping to its cache, even thought it never 
requested for the MAC address. This is possible 
because ARP is stateless. 
ARP Packet Format
To communicate mappings from <protocol, 
address> (<ip,MAC> ) pairs to 48-bit Ethernet 
addresses, a packet format that embodies the 
Address Resolution protocol is needed. The 
format of the packet follows (Plummer, 1982).
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broadcast address as it does not know the target 
host T MAC address and set the ar$op to 1 as ARP 
request message and send out the message. The 
packet will be processed by all hosts connected 
to the network. Only the host carries the IP 
address specified in the ar$tpa will process this 
packet. It will extract the ar$sha from the ARP 
request packet and set it to ar$tha in the ARP 
reply packet. It will also set the ar$tpa to the IP 
address of host S from the field ar$spa from the 
ARP request message. It then sets the ar$spa with 
its IP address which will be the same IP address 
specified in the ar$tpa in the ARP request packet. 
Finally, it will set the ar$sha as its MAC address 
and ar$op to 2 as ARP reply and send this ARP 
reply packet to host S. 
 The problem lies on how the ar$tha is set to 
a host address while we do not know the target 
host address? In this case we will need to send 
the ARP request to one host only that is known to 
every host thus the ARP request message could 
be properly processed and ARP reply message 
generated. The know host in this case is what 
referred as ARP server. The ARP server is the host 
that keeps the <ip,MAC> mapping of all hosts 
connected to the same network. We will explain 
how the server is being set up in to process all 
the ARP requests sent by other hosts.
Protocol Design Goals
In summary:
1) To change the behavior of ARP broadcasting 
messages to ARP unicast.
2) To set up an ARP server to process all ARP 
request messages send to the server.
3) To collect all the <ip,MAC> mapping of all 
hosts connected to the same network for ARP 
server to function properly.
4) To enable the ARP server to setup the 
<ip,MAC> mapping of all hosts without 
causing extra packets being sent in the 
network otherwise the benefits are reduced 
– i.e. to reduce unnecessary messages in 
resolving <ip,MAC> mappings.
5) To enable the new approach to cater for 
manual IP assigning.
PROPOSED APPROACH
In order to grab the mapping of <ip,MAC> of any 
host, the DHCP protocol is the best resource as 
DHCP server is the one responsible in distributing 
the IP address to all hosts. But, DHCP never keep 
track of which host having which IP address. Thus, 
it is required to know how DHCP works in order 
to understand the new approach.
DHCP
Whenever any host is connected to a network, 
the host will need to be assigned an IP address 
(either manually or through DHCP). This section 
will explain how DHCP assignation of IP address 
is catered in the new approach. In any cases the IP 
address is assigned manually, the new approach 
has taken that into considerations as well. When 
the host gets connected to the network, it will 
pass through some steps in order to get an IP 
address from the DHCP server, the DHCP server 
will leases the IP address to the host, in other 
words the IP address is temporarily assigned to 
the host. This is to ensure that in any cases where 
the host is disconnected from the network, the IP 
address that is not used can be assigned to other 
host connected to the network later. Other the IP 
address, DHCP server will distribute other settings 
to the host as well including the subnet mask, 
gateway address, lease period of IP and some 
other information. In any network, there could 
be more than one DHCP sever distributing IP 
addresses to all hosts connected to the network. 
The range of IP address assigned by different 
DHCP servers are different, to avoid the possibility 
of IP conflicts. DHCP works over UDP.
DHCP Scenarios
In assigning IP addresses to hosts, there are many 
scenarios to be considered. This paper will show 
all scenarios and prove the new approach is 
consistent, having catered for all scenarios.
Scenario 1 – INIT
In this case, the host is connected to the network 
for the first time. The host S will send a DHCP 
DISCOVER message type as broadcast message. 
The DHCP server will responds with the DHCP 
OFFER message type. There might be more than 
one such message as it depends on how many 
DHCP servers in the network. Upon decision, the 
host S sends a DHCP REQUEST (broadcast) to 
the DHCP server. The reason the DHCP REQUEST 
message is broadcasted so that other DHCP 
server offering IP addresses will know that the 
client is not requesting IP addresses from them 
thus could assign the IP address to other hosts. 
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If  everything is fine the DHCP server will respond 
with a DHCP ACK message and the client is 
considered bound that is, it is assigned an IP 
address and can start communicating with any 
hosts in the network.
Scenario 2 – RENEW/REBIND
In this case, the host is connected to the network 
and the IP address leased from the DHCP server 
is approaching its lease expiry time. There are 
two Timers in the lease expiry mechanism. First 
is the Time to renew, T1, and second is the Time 
to Rebind, T2. At T1, S will send a DHCP REQUEST 
(unicast) and expects a DHCP ACK from the server. 
If DHCP ACK is received, the lease validity of this IP 
address is set to maximum. If not, and T2 is almost 
up, S will send the DHCP Request as broadcast 
and expects a DHCP ACK from the DHCP server. 
If DHCP ACK is received, the lease validity of this 
IP address is set to maximum. If no DHCP ACK is 
received and T2 is expired, the host S will enter 
into INIT mode again as in Scenario 1.
Scenario 3 – INIT-REBOOT
In this case, the host is connected to the network 
and the host is rebooting for whatever reason. 
Upon booting up, it will send a DHCP Request 
message and expect a DHCP ACK from the server. 
If no DHCP ACK is received the host S will enter 
INIT mode again as in Scenario 1.
Scenario 4 - DHCP NAK/DHCP DECLINE
In this case, the IP address requested by the client 
has been given by a DHCP server but the client 
found that the IP address is actually assigned to 
someone else. The host will enter INIT mode again 
as in Scenario 1.
Scenario 5 - DHCP RELEASE
In this case, the IP address given to this client is 
no more needed by the client. The machine will 
send a DHCP RELEASE message to the DHCP 
server. The next time it wants to connect to the 
same network again, it will enter INIT mode again 
as in Scenario 1
Scenario 6 – DHCP INFORM
In this case, the IP address is being assigned 
manually to the host and the host will send a 
DHCP INFORM to the DHCP server informing the 
server that the IP address is taken by the host. The 
DHCP server might send a DHCP ACK message 
to the host for other information needed by the 
client without giving a new IP address to the 
host.
Summary Of All Scenarios
In any of the above scenarios, for the host to be 
assigned an IP address, there is one common cycle 
to go through in order to consider that the host is 
being assigned an IP address. The message cycles 
for all scenarios are shown in table 1. Obviously, 
the two messages that must be found are DHCP 
REQUEST message send from the client and the 
DHCP ACK message from the DHCP server. The 
message type of DHCP could be recognized from 
the DHCP options (Microsoft, 2006).














1. DISCOVER 1. REQUEST * 1. REQUEST 1. REQUEST 1. RELEASE*
2. OFFER 2. ACK* 2. ACK 2. ACK 2. DISCOVER
3. REQUEST 3. DECLINE 3. OFFER
4. ACK 4. DISCOVER 4. REQUEST
5. OFFER 5. ACK
6. REQUEST
7. ACK
* -  Unicast message 
16 J.L.Tai et al./ Jurnal Kejuruteraan 21 (2009): 11-20
Figure 2.  Activity diagram for new ARP Protocol
DESIGN ARCHITECTURE
This new approach has basically two main 
modules. The first module is to build up the ARP 
table:- This module basically listens to all packets 
transferred between each hosts in the network 
and filter out those non-interested packets and 
try to build up the ARP table based on the DHCP 
messages passed between each host and the 
DHCP server. The second module to generate 
the ARP Reply.- This module will answer all 
ARP requests from other hosts on the network 
by looking into all ARP request packets and 
search from the ARP table in cache if it has the 
MAC address of the host having the IP address 
specified in the ARP request packet and reply the 
host with an ARP reply packet should the server 
have that entry in the cache.
LOGIC DIAGRAM
The logic activity diagram of the protocol is 
shown in Figure 2.
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PSEUDOCODE
Following is the pseudocode for the new approach:
 ?Is this an UDP or ARP packet?
Yes: an ARP Packet (Assume in the new approach there will be no more ARP   Reply message send 
from other machine except from the ARP server thus this ARP message must be a ARP Request. 
Even if in this classic ARP environment, the MAC of the ARP server will never exist in ARP.MAC 
thus it will never find the record of this ARP server in the ARP table thus will never generates the 
ARP reply bringing the system into infinity loop)
      Get the TargetIP address (ar$spa field in ARP packet format)
      Get the SourceIP address (ar$tpa field in ARP packet format)
      Get the Target MAC address (ar$sha field in ARP packet format)
Retrieve the record from ARP table for IPAddress (ARP.IPAddress)= SourceIP and valid = true
                 Found:
                      Get the Source MAC address (ARP.MAC)
Generates an ARP reply setting ar$spa =  SourceIP address, ar$sha =
SourceMAC address, ar$tpa = TargetIP address, ar$tha = Target MAC 
address
Yes: a UDP Packet 
      ?What type of DHCP Message?
       If DHCP Type = DHCP Request: 
                      Get the XID from the DHCP packet (xid in DHCP packet format)
           Retrieve the record from DHCP table (DHCP.XID) with this XID
           Found:
               Log the error into LOG table (DHCP record for this XID should not 
               exist as XID is a unique number)
                      Not Found:
Insert new record into DHCP table setting DHCP.XID=XID,
DHCP.MAC = Source MAC address from the DHCP Packet (chaddr in 
DHCP packet format),  DHCP.IPAddress = Source IP address from the 
DHCP Packet (yiaddr in DHCP packet format), Time1 =  Current Time
       If DHCP Type = DHCP ACK: 
            Get the XID from the DHCP packet (xid in DHCP packet format)
            Get the MAC address from the DHCP packet (chaddr in 
                DHCP packet format)
                       Retrieve the record from DHCP table (DHCP.XID) with this XID
                       Found:
                 Get the IP address from the DHCP packet (yiaddr in DHCP packet 
             format)
                            Retrieve the record from ARP (ARP.MAC) with this MAC address
    Found:
Update ARP table setting ARP.IPAddress to the IP address (the   
machine with the MAC address has been assigned a new IP address)
                           Not Found:
     Insert new record into ARP table setting ARP.MAC= MAC address,    
     ARP.IPaddress = IP address, ARP.Dynamic = true, Valid = true (this     
     is a new machine connected to this network)
Not Found:
    Log the error into LOG table (DHCP record for this XID should be  
    exist as DHCP ACK packet would not be generated without DHCP  
    Request)
                  If DHCP Type = DHCP DECLINE or DHCP NAK: 
Get the MAC address from the DHCP Packet (chaddr in 
    DHCP packet format)
                       Retrieve the record from ARP (ARP.MACAddress) with this MAC address
            Found:
                             Set the valid field (ARP.Valid) for this record to false 
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ADDRESS RESOLUTION IN UNICAST MODE
The new approach to ARP accomplishes the 
protocol design objectives as outlined in Section 
2.4 as follows:
1) To change the behavior of ARP broadcasting 
messages to ARP unicast.
 All ARP messages either ARP request or ARP 
reply are all in unicast mode.
2) To set up an ARP server to process all ARP 
request messages send to the server.
 The ARP server has been set up in order to 
prove the new approach is workable.
3) To collect all the <ip,MAC> mapping of all 
hosts connected to the same network for 
ARP server to function properly.
 The mechanism has shown how the <ip,MAC> 
mapping of all hosts connected to the same 
network are being collected by the ARP 
server
4) To enable the ARP server to setup the 
<ip,MAC> mapping of all hosts without 
causing extra packets being send in 
the network otherwise forfeited the 
purpose of this paper – i.e. to reduce 
unnecessary messages in resolving 
<ip,MAC> mappings
 The new approach managed to use the DHCP 
messages in order to build up the ARP table in 
the ARP server without introducing additional 
overhead for the same purpose.
5) To enable the new approach to cater for 
manual IP assigning.
 In order to cater for manual IP addresses, the 
new approach allows the administrator to 
key in the <ip,MAC> manually into the ARP 
server’s ARP table and the administrator could 
even set the dynamic field of the table to false 
to indicate that this address was assigned by 
the administrator.
PERFORMANCE
In order to prove the new approach does not 
compromise the performance of ARP even as it 
is reducing the network load, the ARP server was 
tested in order to answer one ARP request from 
one of the host connected to the same network. 
In Fig. 5, we see that the machine 192.168.1.163 
sends a broadcast ARP request and the machine 
192.168.1.124 which the sender was trying to 
resolve to MAC address replies with the ARP 
reply immediately as shown in packet 14 above. 
Note that on packet 19, the ARP server sends an 
ARP reply from the ARP table and the machine 
192.168.1.163 receives the reply. Also note 
that before the machine 192.168.1.163 got the 
reply from the ARP server, the communication 
between 192.168.1.163 and 192.168.1.124 were 
going on (packet 15 and 16), the communication 
keeps going on after the ARP server sends the 
ARP reply (packet 21 and 22). Thus, it proved 
that the ARP cache of machine 192.168.1.163 
has got the correct entry for the MAC address 
of 192.168.124. Noticed that the time difference 
introduced is only 2.269030 – 2.128479 which 
is 0.140551 second. If implemented with a 
lower level programming language like C, the 
time difference is expected to be even less 
significant.
ARP in WAN
In order to bring the same concept into Wide Area 
Network, the new approach can cater for it easily 
as each network separated by the broadcast 
domain will each have their own ARP server. 
When one packet needs to travel to another 
broadcast domain, the router or gateway will take 
part in two broadcast domain and thus manage 
to pass the packet to another broadcast domain. 
The message can then be easily transported 
to the destination just like what happen in 
traditional ARP mechanism.
CONCLUSIONS
This work is derived from the point of reducing 
unnecessary ARP broadcast messages. After 
the ARP behavior is changed to unicast mode, 
the ARP request and reply will work in unicast 
mode and no more ARP messages are flying all 
around the network. All ARP replies will be from 
the ARP server and the hacker cannot perform 
ARP poisoning easily as any other ARP replies 
can be ignored in the future version of ARP. Any 
non-authorized host cannot be connected to 
the network. If the hacker would like to perform 
anything in the network, it must release its 
MAC address in the network in order to join 
the network as the <ip,MAC> mapping will be 
updated in the ARP server for all DHCP clients 
or inserted into ARP table by the administrator. 
Any hacker would not risk that by revealing 
themselves.
 In future version of ARP, it could be easily 
modified to add more security into the ARP 
without implementing other complicated 
mechanisms, as the basic mechanism of ARP 
uncasting reduces many chances of information 
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